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FOREWORD: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
ERIC A. KADES*

The macroeconomic problems facing nations have changed little
over the last century. Undeveloped nations continue to look for tools
to increase the growth rate of their economies. Developed nations,
content with or perhaps resigned to modest long-term growth rates,
focus more on business cycles, with their inevitable downturns
(recessions and depressions). Law and economics scholarship, with
a few minor exceptions, has little to offer business cycle theorists.'
This is not surprising. Law and economics generally applies the
tools of microeconomics, not macroeconomics, and even relatively
recent scholarship on the microeconomic foundations of business
cycles does not involve issues commonly addressed by law and
economics scholars.
Until fairly recently, the same could have been said about growth
theory. Its traditional focus on accumulation of capital, stages of
* Cabell Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law. B.A., Yale
University; J.D., Yale University.
1. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics,45 STAN. L. REV. 1215 (1993) (surveying macroeconomic theories identifying
the relationship between legal institutions and employment stability); Steven A. Ramirez,
Fear And Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42
WASHBuRN L.J. 31 (2002) (arguing that public fear influences the economy more than any
macroeconomically significant event).
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development, and creation of key infrastructure-for example, roads
and railroads-did not require the application of expertise in microlevel, legal relations.2 Over the last decade or two, however,
economists have begun to focus on microeconomic legal foundations
that may be catalysts of growth for undeveloped economies. In
particular, they have devoted considerable attention to the role that
property rights play in economic development.3
Given that economists have been gearing up on the role that
property rights play in economic growth, it would seem natural for
legal scholars of property, and especially those with a law and
economics bent, to follow this lead. Property, after all, is essentially
a legal construct. Moreover, it permeates the foundations of
developed legal systems: contracts is about the consensual transfer
of property rights; torts is about the protection of property rights
from nonconsensual harm.
Yet it seems clear that property law scholars, the author included,
generally have not followed their economist colleagues into the
breach. Here is one piece of anecdotal evidence: over the last five
years, ten leading law journals have published ten articles, summing to 714 pages, on the finer points of the Constitution's Takings
Clause. 4 Over the same period, these journals have published only
two articles, summing to 105 pages, on the role of property rights in
economic development.5
This is not to say that the Takings Clause (on which the author
has published more than his fair share) is an unworthy subject;
indeed, later in this introductory essay we will highlight the
importance of the principles for which it stands. Moreover, in
America and other developed economies, at least outside of the
ghettos discussed at the end of this essay, the Takings Clause is
more relevant to everyday life than economic development in the
Third World. To the extent that taxpayers directly or indirectly fund
legal research at public law schools (such as my employer), our focus
on the finer points of doctrines of interest to the domestic citizenry
2. See generally DEBRAJ RAY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS chs. 2, 3 (1998) (providing an

overview of traditional economic development and growth theories).
3. See extensive cites to the economics literature on property rights in developing nations
cited by Field and by Lanjouw & Levy in their contributions to this symposium.
4. See infra Appendix.
5. See infra Appendix.
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may make some sense. Yet it seems that, if we were to attach equal
weight to the welfare of every person planet-wide, property scholars
might well maximize their marginal product by devoting less time
to the Takings Clause and other fine points of domestic property
law, and more time to the role that property rights may play in
bringing affluence to impoverished nations. At any rate, it is this
thought that motivated me to organize a conference that would
enlighten property scholars about economists' work on property
rights in developing economies, and vice versa.
For legal scholars who choose to study the role of property rights
in economic development, an initial question presents itself: What
is their comparative advantage? In what way can they draw on their
special skills and experience to maximize their contribution?
Economists are better equipped to address many questions. For
example, they are trained to develop theoretical models that capture
the essence of costs, benefits, and trade-offs. They are also better
equipped to conduct the statistical research necessary to put such
theories to the test, and to uncover mechanisms that theorists may
have overlooked. Erica Field's contribution to the symposium, for
example, used data gathered in Peru to make a strong case that
establishing property rights may free up labor used to protect
possession in economies without such rights.6 Jenny Lanjouw, in her
contribution co-authored with Philip Levy, finds that titled owners
are twice as likely to rent out their properties; presumably, lack of
title makes even a temporary transfer of possession too risky.7
Having ceded theoretical and statistical work to the economists,
is there anything left for legal scholars? Contributions to the
symposium suggest two affirmative answers that draw on intimate
knowledge of the institutions behind property rights. First, at a
level of high generality, one of the staples of legal scholarship is the
definition of property rights, and the division of such rights in
analytically helpful categories. Perhaps most famously, property law
scholars speak incessantly of the "bundle of sticks" that constitute
6. Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and Household Time
Allocation in Urban SquatterCommunities: Evidence From Peru, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837
(2004).

7. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost.Benefit
Frameworkfor Titling Programs,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 889, 921-25 (2004).
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property: various combinations of the rights to exclude, to use, and
to alienate as the three sticks that, tied together, make up the
bundle of rights we commonly associate with the word "property."8
A more recent example is the division of remedies for violations of
property rights into two categories: "property rights" providing as
much protection as the legal system can offer, and lesser "liability
rights" that limit remedies to fair market compensation, permitting others to force a transaction on an unwilling owner.9 Brett
McDonnell's contribution to this symposium focuses on the role that
institutions play in defining the contours of property rights. 10
Second, legal scholars have extensive knowledge of the nuts and
bolts of everyday property relations, across a wide range of times
and economies, from feudal times to the present. This idiosyncratic
collection of knowledge can be viewed as a source of suggestive,
imprecise empirical data. Perhaps of greater importance, legal
researchers are experts on key institutions, often unfamiliar to
economists, that are essential to well-functioning markets. There
is perhaps no better example than title insurance, a private
ordering solution to the problem of uncertainty over the state of
legal ownership of land discussed in Joyce Palomar's contribution
to the symposium.12 Economists, and others without some experience in real property law, would be shocked at the disarray of the

8. One of the earlier uses of the "bundle of sticks" analogy for property rights was by
Benjamin N. Cardozo. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129
(1928) ("The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not
constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to time.")
9. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105-06 (1972).
10. Brett H. McDonnell, Lessons from the Rise and (Possible)Fallof Chinese TownshipVillage Enterprises,45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 953 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber,ReassessingBoomer Justice,Efficiency, and NuisanceLaw,
in PROPERTY LAw AND LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988)
(analyzing economic efficiency of injunctive relief for nuisance victims); Herma Hill Kay, From
the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the
United States Duringthe Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000) (describing, inter
alia, evolution of women's rights in marital property); Robert M. Washburn, ResidentialReal
Estate ConditionDisclosureLegislation,44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381 (1995) (describing transition
from caveat emptor to requiring seller disclosure of latent material defects in real estate
transactions).
12. Joyce Palomar, ContributionsLegal Scholars Can Make to Development Economics:
Examples from China, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (2004).
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public land records in most jurisdictions,1 3 yet title insurance, along
with subsidiary institutions, permits relatively easy alienability of
these systemic defects in land recorders' offices
real property despite
14
across the nation.
As intimated in the preceding paragraphs, we can define property
rights functionally in terms of the institutions that create and
protect them. Organizing our discussion in terms of the sticks in the
bundle of property rights-exclusion, use, and alienation-the first
essential institution is some sort of police force to protect possession,
that is, to enforce exclusionary rights. Upper- and middle-class
property owners in developed nations may take the presence of a
well-organized police force for granted. One need only look to areas
lacking an effective police force to see the high costs of self-protection imposed on property owners. 5 Again, Erica Field's Article on
this issue shows that lack of legal title forces some family members
to forgo gainful employment so they can protect possession of their
homes.16
The judiciary is the institution responsible for facilitating
alienability of property, and for deterring interference with use. The
only justification for the enormous body of contract law is that it
greases the wheels of commerce; combined with the division of labor,
easy trading lies at the root of the wealth of developed economies.
It is easy to forget the importance of simple exchange, though
economists are unlikely to suffer such an oversight; all of the
considerable analytic machinery of competitive market models boils
down to exhausting all opportunities for mutually advantageous
trades. The judiciary also serves as a backstop to the police in
deterring nonconsensual interference with exclusion and use-i.e.,
torts.
The police and the judiciary are the central institutions in
maintaining property rights. Earlier portions of this introduction
referred to other such institutions: the public land records, and title
13. LEWIs M. SIMEs, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION xvi (1985).
14. PAuL E. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES, 28-29 (2d ed. 1970).
15. Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Using the Private Sector to Deter Crime (identifying the
increasing amount spent even in the United States on private security guards and systems
in response to at least perceived ineffective police forces), at http://www.ncpa.orgtstudies/s181/
s181e.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
16. See Field, supra note 6, at 857-59.
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insurance. The word "institution," especially in a discussion that
began with the police and judiciary, may carry with it an implicit
suggestion that we are talking about public institutions; we should
avoid any such notion. For economically minded policymakers, the
relevant normative question is whether the market can provide
something, or the identification of some market failure that requires
state intervention.
For example, there is widespread, though not universal, agreement that the police and judiciary are public goods: any attempt
at private provision of these services would run into problems
due to the difficulty of excluding nonpurchasers from many of their
17
benefits.
Land records, on the other hand, do not suffer from nonexcludability; indeed, title insurance companies frequently establish
their own, better-organized private versions of the public records
and, of course, exclude their competitors (or anyone else) from using
this valuable informational capital. 8 Use of land records, however,
is nonrivalrous, so they have at least one of the attributes of a public
good." 9 In addition, it is possible that the provision of land records
is a natural monopoly: high fixed costs for each producer may mean
that a single provider can minimize total cost per unit.2 °
Undeveloped economies surely could benefit significantly from
greater state provision of any of these goods or services that the
market cannot provide. More police, at least of the noncorrupt
variety, would enable people to devote less time and resources to
protecting existing property, and more to creating additional wealth.
More efficient and impartial judges would facilitate trade and
minimize tortious damage to body and property. We could add many
other public goods to this list. Markets in developing economies may
undersupply education because of imperfect capital markets
-children cannot borrow to fund schooling that would enable them
to be much more productive and easily pay back such loans. If
education has positive external benefits, that is an additional reason
17. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 42-45 (5th ed. 1989) (defining public goods as those that are
nonexcludable or nonrivalrous).
18. BASYE, supra note 14, at 14.
19. See id.; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 17.
20. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19-21 (2002).
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the market would underproduce it. Roads and airports are other
public goods mentioned earlier that might also yield significant
returns in undeveloped nations.
The problem with providing more police, judges, roads, or
education, of course, is that they are expensive. Poor countries (by
definition!) don't have sufficient resources to provide many highly
productive public goods. In addition, the benefits from many of
these goods, especially education, take decades to materialize. The
seductiveness of providing property rights via titling programs is
their low cost and rapid impact. It takes a relatively small cadre of
public surveyors and bureaucrats to grant title to squatters. The
hope is that a modest up-front investment will yield large returns
in a short time.
The role of land titles in property law is precisely the sort of issue
on which legal academics have expertise. As both Robert Ellickson
and Thomas W. Merrill pointed out during two different discussions
at the symposium, title is a relative matter. Someone who finds a
piece of personal property (a watch, for example) has title as against
everyone else except the "true owner" who lost it. 21 In the context of
real property, state recognition of title confers two quite different
benefits. First, if it is anything more than a sham, granting title is
at least a partial recognition that the new owner has property rights
as against the state itself. Second, it usually carries with it the
implicit promise that the new owner may draw on the police and
the judiciary to defend her property rights against other private
parties.22
Property rights against the state and against other private
parties differ both in the small and in the large. In the small, an
owner's rights against the state are generally weaker than her
21. Common law decisions articulating this foundational principle of finders' law date
back at least to Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 379 (K.B. 1722), and continue to the
present day. See, e.g., Terryv. Lock Hospitality, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 202 (Ark. 2001) (dealing with
a box of old currency found during a hotel renovation).
22. Felix Cohen nutshelled the institution of property by imagining that owners attached
the following sign to all items of (tangible, at least) property that they own:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogueon PrivateProperty, 9 RUTGERs L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).
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rights against other private parties. For example, the state can force
a title holder to sell at a court-determined fair (market) price; this
is the power of eminent domain, to effectuate a taking for just
compensation. Private parties, outside of some relatively narrow
exceptions, 3 cannot force an owner to sell. To take another example,
the state has broad powers to regulate property use without the
consent of a property holder;2 4 in a democracy, this means a majority
can foist regulations on everyone. Private parties wishing to impose
regulations on property use must obtain the consent of every last
party affected.25
In the large, nations can and do provide various gradations of
property rights versus the state and versus others. To highlight the
basic society-wide possibilities, the following table boils down the
two continua into four categories.

23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 334.30 (2002) (creating process to condemn for private
transportation facilities); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 486.252 (1998) (giving electric and gas
power companies power to condemn); JOHN LEWIS, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 250 (3d ed. 1997); MCKINNEYS HIGHWAY LAW § 300 (giving
private power to condemn if landlocked).
24. Thus absent a special per se rule (e.g., permanent physical invasion, or destruction
of all economically viable use), property owners are unlikely to win regulatory takings claims.
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that zoning amendment that limited
construction on a five-acre parcel to at most five houses was not a taking); Penn Cent. Trans.
Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding landmark designation that prevented
construction of skyscraper in midtown Manhattan was not a taking).
25. Absent a prior agreement empowering a majority of owners to alter them, changing
private land use restrictions ("covenants") requires the consent of all owners. Jeffrey E. Stake,
Toward an Economic Understandingof Touch and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 938.
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Property Rights v. State
Strong
Developed Nations
(1) strong police and
courts protect property against other
private parties
Strong

(2) constitutional
rules and norms limit
government expropriation

Property

Weak
Predatory Police State;
e.g., Soviet Union and
other former communist regimes; North
Korea, Zimbabwe today
(1) Powerful police
state maintains strict
order where desired
(2) Same powerful
state faces no constraints in expropriating property

Rights v.
Other
Private
Parties

"The Anemic State"

Weak

(1) Weak state unable to provide effective police, judiciary,
land titling, and
other property institutions

(1) State is strong
enough to engage in
predation
(2) State refuses to protect property owners
from their neighbors

(2) State so weak it
cannot expropriate; a
weak state is the
functional equivalent
of strong property
rights against the
state

Developed nations tend to provide strong property rights against
both the state and others. As mentioned earlier in this essay,
police and judicial protections are generally so well-established and
effective in developed nations that they are taken for granted. Thus
property rights scholarship about such legal systems tends to focus
on protections against state expropriation. The prime example in
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the United States, of course, is the Takings Clause mentioned at the
beginning of this introduction.
The lack of such protections is perhaps the primary distinction
between market economies and the traditional communist economies of the former Soviet Union, its eastern European satellites,
and China before the reforms of the last three decades. The
omnipresent security and police forces generally protected citizens
from thievery by other private persons; people were generally secure
in the possession of their homes and personal property. 26 Yet if the
state decided it needed your property, there was no recourse to such
naked expropriation. v
The lower right box of the table above describes a world in which
the government, in addition to engaging in predation itself, fails
to protect property owners from private predation. It is hard to
imagine a historical example of such a state. As a matter of selfinterest, it makes little sense for a powerful government bent on
grabbing wealth for itself to permit private parties to compete with
it. Such a state likely could maximize its take by monopolizing the
role of predator. In the short run it could grab more, and in the long
run it could curb its predations to a level that would give citizens
some incentives to create wealth.
Finally, the lower left box envisions a seemingly odd situation:
the state provides little protection against private interference with
property rights, yet poses little threat itself to property. There is,
however, a natural and indeed common explanation for this oddity:
a weak government. Such a state is too weak to protect owners
against private predations, and is itself too weak to pose any sort of
threat to property rights. This model of a weak state may be a
reasonable description of the government in many undeveloped
nations in South America and Africa.
This categorization, at first blush, suggests that the major
problem with property rights in such nations is the weakness of the
26. See generally Soviet Union-A Country Study, Chapter 19: Internal Security, The
Ministry of Internal Affairs, The Judicial Organs, and Nonpolitical Crime, Nonpolitical Crime
and Punishment (May 1989) (discussing the Soviet Union's low crime rate relative to the
United States), at http'hnemory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sutoc.html.
27. See generally Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Propertyin the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481 (1993) (discussing the new
property laws of the RSFSR).
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police, the judiciary, and other institutions that protect owners
against private interference with property rights. As implied earlier,
there is no cheap solution to this set of problems: Effective and
honest police forces and judiciaries are expensive. A naked grant of
title, unsupported by effective protection against the predations of
others, is worth little more than the paper on which it is printed.
Missing from this equation, however, is what may be a critical
and underappreciated feature of undeveloped nations: state ownership of large tracts of valuable land, in rural, urban, and especially
in suburban areas at the edge of rapidly expanding cities. The very
same weakness of government that protects private owners from
public expropriation in undeveloped nations will lead to mismanagement of these lands.
Based on the empirical work of Field, Lanjouw and Levy, and
others, it seems that in South America large numbers of urban
immigrants participate in land rushes that result in squatter
communities on state-owned property.2 8 Indeed, Lanjouw and Levy
report that "[dlue to their prevalence throughout the developing
world, land invasions and informal systems of land tenure have
been the focus of considerable research."29 Organizers with political savvy and perhaps some political connections orchestrate the
process. Once a critical mass of squatters has moved in, they begin
to clamor for formal recognition of their claims.
It is difficult to understand why these governments make little if
any effort to transfer title directly to the waves of rural inhabitants
flocking to cities as their economies adopt more efficient agricultural
methods and develop other industries. In trying to understand this
pattern of land distribution, it is helpful to consider the experience
of other nations during their industrial revolutions. In England, the
Normans divvied up most of the country to lords, who in turn
granted land on feudal terms to sublords, and so on in a chain of
obligation. ° Eventually many small holders (copyholders) came to
own their parcels. 3 ' More relevant for comparison to the South
American experience, by the time England began to industrialize
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Lanjouw & Levy, supra, note 7, at 893 & nn.7-8.
Id. at 894.
A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HIsTORY OF THE LAND LAW 2-6 (2d ed. 1986).
Id. at 155-72.
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and thus major population movements took place, most of the
undeveloped area around cities (suburbia) likely was in the hands
of private owners who had the incentives and the initiative to meet
the demand of rural immigrants.
The United States began with an immense stock of public lands,
and more than tripled it with the Louisiana Purchase and other
acquisitions.3 2 Contrast continued state ownership of large and
valuable suburban tracts in South America with the distribution of
these vast public lands owned by the United States. The American
government devoted considerable energy throughout the 1800s to
transferring most acreage to private citizens. It surveyed millions
of acres, set up land offices in remote regions, offered land at
relatively low prices, provided financing at a time when private
capital for this purpose was generally unavailable, and eventually
gave away millions of acres to homesteaders.33 By the time cities
like Cincinnati, Chicago, Denver, or San Francisco began to develop,
most of the surrounding area was in private hands.3 4 As these
cities expanded, self-interested owners either developed suburbia
themselves, or sold to the highest bidder-invariably a professional
developer.
Why have Peru, Ecuador, and perhaps other undeveloped nations
failed to transfer title to rural immigrants to suburbia in a similar
fashion? The answer may be that their governments have long been,
and continue to be, relatively weak, poor, and disorganized.3 1Simply
put, they have been inefficient land managers, unable to undertake
on their own initiative the surveying and sale of their extensive
suburban land holdings despite swelling demand.
Seen in this light, the pattern of organized land rushes followed
by demands to validate the squatters' ownership may actually be
32. BENJAMIN H. HIBBARD, AHISTORYOFTHE PUBLIC LAND POLICiEs 13 tbl.1 (Univ. ofWis.
Press 1965) (1924) (describing an initial public domain of about 347,000 square miles), id. at
14 (noting that the Louisiana Purchase embraced about 828,000 square miles), id. at 16-31
(describing other purchases).
33. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT ch. 15 (1968).

34. Cf. HIBBARD, supra note 32, at 408-09 (summarizing the effects of these transfers of
public land).
35. See Rebecca Trent, Comment, Implications for Foreign Direct Investment in SubSaharanAfrica Underthe African Growth OpportunityAct, 23 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 213,230
(2002) (identifying "fear of national laws, debt burdens, corrupting, and poor infrastructure
and management" as the major limitations on investment in sub-Saharan Africa).
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the best feasible method to effectuate the transfer of land to those
who value it most. Organizers and their followers provide the
initiative and part of the investment necessary to establish new
residential suburbs. They then turn to the government to solidify
their claims. From this perspective, the organizers of these land
rushes, far from being the head of a massive criminal enterprise,
have much in common with residential property subdividers and
developers in wealthier nations where more efficient governments
have privatized most land.
This observation runs counter to the usual assumption that
unplanned development is inefficient. Lanjouw and Levy, for
instance, note that
we might think that such land invasions are a bad way to settle
property. Often invasions occur in marginal areas where the
provision of services may be more costly and where conditions
are poor or even dangerous; and it is always more difficult to put
in infrastructure after housing has been built."
The problem is that, if the state is truly impotent, planned real
estate development simply may be impossible. The alternatives are
then squatter developments or no developments at all.
It is interesting to contrast this sanguine view of gaining title by
squatting-adverse possession-in weak nations with its treatment
in countries which better manage their public lands. Although a few
states permit private parties to gain title to public land by adverse
possession on some terms as against private owners, most along
with the federal government either bar adverse possession against
themselves or make it more difficult.37 This different treatment may
well make sense because of differences between the United States
and South American nations in the nature of the lands each
government owns.38 In contrast to the suburban tracts targeted by
36. Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 7, at 908.
37. See generally Carl C. Risch, Comment, Encouragingthe Responsible Use of Land by
Municipalities: The Erosion of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of Adverse
PossessionagainstMunicipal Land Owners, 99 DICK. L. REV. 197, 197-98 (1994) (describing
different methods jurisdictions use to bring adverse possession claims against municipal
governments).
38. Symposium, Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law, Round Table Discussion,
64 WASH U. L.Q. 793, 832-33 (1986) (comments of Robert C. Ellickson).

828

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:815

urban immigrants in South America, most land owned by the
federal and state governments is rural-parks and wilderness. It
would be very expensive to monitor for squatters in, for example
Yellowstone National Park, which consists of over 2.2 million acres,
much of which is wilderness accessible only by foot.3 9 Moreover, the
raison d'dtre for the existence of such lands is frequently to serve as
a commons. It would be doubly difficult, then, for the government
to distinguish between "regular" park users posing no threat of
adverse possession and those continuing their presence in a manner
substantial enough to satisfy the normal requirements of adverse
possession.
Returning to South Americans adversely possessing suburban
lands owned by their governments, what exactly do they stand to
gain by obtaining official title to their homestead? They clearly
gain a prima facie defense to any attempt by the state to regain
title, though if the state is weak this is not a serious threat.
More significantly, formal title may make them more secure against
private predation. If real property law in South America tracks
American law, a squatter, like a finder of personal property, has
title against all the world except the true owner (the holder of legal
title) so long as the requirements of adverse possession are satisfied.
Under this rule, squatters should not have to worry about incursions by other private parties.
If, however, as we are assuming, the state is weak, the police and
the courts may be ineffective, erroneous in their findings, or partial
to one side because of bribes and political influence. When these
fundamental property institutions are so flawed, squatters might
worry that they will lose disputes with later claimants due to
the incompetence or venality of the police and the courts. Formal
legal title granted by the state, however, will simplify disputes, by
making errors less likely and partiality more difficult to conceal.
The central finding of Erica Field's contribution to this symposium,
that obtaining formal title enables households to reduce time on
protecting possession and increase time devoted to earning income,
suggests that formal title indeed does assist squatters in securing
39. Yellowstone National Park, Facts (listing FY 2002 acreage), at http//www.nps.gov/
yell/pphtml/facts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); Yellowstone Fact Sheet (indicating that
eighty percent of park is forested), at httpJ/www.nps.gov/yell/technical/yellfact.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2004).
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their claims against interlopers. Field reports additional findings
that buttress her case. First, title tends to release male household
members for work outside the home; 4° presumably men have a
comparative advantage defending homesteads when families fear
incursions. Second, she finds that households without title disproportionately operate businesses out of their homes, enabling them
to simultaneously protect possession and earn some income.4 '
Similarly, Lanjouw and Levy's finding that those with title are more
than twice as likely to rent their properties suggests that formal
title confers on owners feelings of security in ultimate title sufficient
to make them comfortable granting time-limited rights to others.42
Formal legal title may also facilitate the alienability of land and,
as trumpeted by Hernando de Soto, the use of land as collateral for
loans to facilitate entrepreneurship by home owners.4 ' Though
unclear as presented by de Soto, the story here must be that the
interest rate on unsecured loans is much higher than the rate on
secured loans. The important point is that the utility of title in
obtaining a mortgage is derivative of the direct benefits of title:
Lenders will feel secure and offer much lower interest rates on a
mortgage only if they are confident that the borrower's title-on
which any claim they would make in a foreclosure will be based-is
in practice safe from adverse claims.
The discussion in the previous paragraph is a nice illustration of
the type of contribution that legal scholars can make to the study of
property rights and economic development. Drawing on the legal
principle that a mortgage lender's rights are equivalent to the
borrower's in case of foreclosure, we then focus the inquiry about the
financing benefits of titling onto rights as against two very different
threats: governmental and private. Similarly, it can help economists
gathering data to ask questions in order to harvest information with
the highest possible resolution. For example, Lanjouw and Levy
divide households in their Guayaquil, Ecuador survey into two
groups: purchasers and squatters. It is not clear, however, if the
purchasers bought directly from the state, from a titled private
40. Field, supra note 6, at 860-61.
41. Id. at 858-59.
42. Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 7, at 921-25.
43. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WhY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE

WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 50-51 (2000)
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owner, or from an earlier squatter. If they purchased from a
squatter, then their legal status is exactly the same as a squatter;
just as a foreclosing lender's rights are derivative of her borrower's,
so too a purchaser's rights are no better than her seller's.
Lanjouw and Levy point out another, subtler indirect benefit of
titling: it allows the property holder to "participate directly in the
formal service markets associated with property, including basic
utilities such as water and electricity. Such services are often denied
to untitled landholders, forcing them to rely upon less efficient and
unsafe modes of delivery.""
This discussion has assumed that squatting occurs on publicly
owned land. What, if any, difference should it make if instead incursions occur on privately held land? This is not an idle question;
according to Lanjouw and Levy, "[t]he most common form of ...
irregular settlement [is] unauthorized land developments, which are
often found on private agricultural land on the periphery of cities."45
Presumably the law in developing nations at least roughly parallels
U.S. law: Landlords can sue in trespass to evict squatters, but if
they fail to sue within the statute of limitations for this tort then the
occupier obtains title by adverse possession." Unless the land is
worthless, or worth less than nonrecoverable legal fees, it is difficult
to understand why landlords would fail to protect their rights by
suing trespassers. Of course, if the police and the courts are weak,
it may be impossible in practice for owners to expel squatters.
The more interesting policy questions about disputes between the
landless and the landed revolve around state programs of land
tenure reform and redistribution. Passing over the long-standing
and continuing debates over fairness and the distribution of wealth,
there are important efficiency considerations. Few doubt that
frequent confiscation of land or wealth in general is anathema to
productive activity-why work hard and take risks to accumulate
assets when the government is going to grab them? On the other
hand, a credible one-time redistribution of property may lack these
44. Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 7, at 903.
45. Id. at 896.
46. For a summary of the general contours of adverse possession law in the United States,

see WILLiAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 (3d ed. 2000).
For an overview of adverse possession in Africa, see http//www.lawafrica.com/HOTB/
hotb8.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
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disincentive costs and offer real benefits. For example, redistributing land from idle landlords to tilling tenants may solve agency
costs inherent in employer-employee, sharecropping, and other
arrangements. There is some evidence that land tenure reform after
World War II in Taiwan and Korea contributed to the explosive
growth of those nations in the latter half of the twentieth century."
These reforms usually did not consist of naked redistribution of
land; they instead regulated rents and gave tenants the right to
force landlords to sell them land at prices set by law."' Regulating
rents might be justifiable on efficiency grounds if a small group of
collusive landowners has market power. But what of forced sales
-giving tenants, in effect, the power of eminent domain? By
definition, to be economically efficient, transfer of title to tenants
should occur only when tenants value the land more than landlords.
Why then not leave the parties to determine when this does and
does not hold-i.e., why not rely on an unfettered market?
The answer may come from transactions costs. Tenants who have
resided on a particular parcel may have made plot-specific investments in homes or fields of higher value to themselves than to other
tenants. This places the parties in a bilateral monopoly: parcels are
uniquely valuable in the hands of their current tenants, who thus
will pay above-market rents to retain them. Landlords will accept
offers at one cent above rent that others would pay, but of course
would like to bargain for all of the tenant's premium value on the
parcel. The parties are in a bargaining game over this surplus value,
a situation that likely will involve all sorts ofhijinks (threats to exit,
for example)-transactions costs that are a deadweight loss. As in
other settings,49 the law can short-circuit this bargaining game and
its attendant transactions costs by granting one side the right to
force a transaction at market rates.
Is it possible that this and other lessons from developing countries have applications to poverty here in the United States? An
underdeveloped nation is simply a jurisdiction with a disproportion47. See SHURLEY W.Y. Kuo ETAL., THE TAIWAN SUCCESS STORY 48-55 (1981); BYUNG-NAK
SONG, THE RISE OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 109, 176-77, tbl.7.4 (1997).
48. KUo ET AL., supra note 46, at 48-55; SONG, supra note 46, at 176-77.
49. See RIcHARDA. POSNEECONOMICANALYSiSOFLAW55-56(6thed. 2003) (government
acquisition of key parcels of land for roads), id. at 60-61 (neighbors in dispute over a
nuisance), id. at 117-18 (stranded ship and potential salvor).
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ate number of poor people. The United States certainly has areas
that qualify as underdeveloped. In addition, inner cities like Detroit
have wide swathes of abandoned property, as owners stop paying
taxes on land that they cannot operate profitably.5 ° These parcels
do not look like Yellowstone Park; they are not broad expanses in
the wilderness without roads, designed to be used as a commons.
Moreover, municipal government in Detroit may manage these
lands as inefficiently as South American nations. 5 ' Indeed, Detroit's
government has failed to obtain title to many lots in tax arrears due
to errors and oversights in the tax foreclosure process. By analogy,
then, perhaps we should permit adverse possession against urban
governmental units; as in developing nations, this "bottom-up"
initiative may be the best way to put land in blighted neighborhoods
to productive use.
The similarities between the United States' impoverished
urban landscapes and developing nations go far beyond poor governmental land management. Inadequate police protection leads to
excessive time and expense devoted to self-protection, more costly
goods due to the impact of these costs on businesses, and a host
of similar costs. Poverty, inadequate capital markets, and a weak
tax base lead to underinvestment in education that translates into
wasted human capital. Thus, although one sees little cross-fertilization between the literature on developing economies and the
literature on urban poverty, the fundamental similarities between
the two environments suggest that a creative policy prescription for
one might well work for the other.
This introduction, along with a majority of the conference papers,
focuses largely on realty. Although this may seem dated in the
modern age, it is important to remember that land likely accounts
for a greater percentage of wealth in undeveloped economies than
in developed economies. In addition, its immobility makes it much
more attractive as collateral to secured creditors than other, more
mobile, types of property.
As economies grow, however, we would expect to see more and
more wealth in business enterprises, the other sort of property
considered at the symposium. Corporate shares, interests in part50. See Broken Detroit: Death of a City Block (discussing "vast tracts of abandoned land"
in Detroit), at www.detnews.com/specialreports2001/elmhurst (June 17, 2001).
51. See id.
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nerships, and other forms of property rights in business enterprises
bear few similarities to land when we consider property relations
among private parties. Exclusion, the central right in land enforced
by police and courts, is not an issue for such intangible assets.
Unlike trespass in particular and real property law in general,
business entity laws are "enabling" rather than constraining:
corporate and other statutes provide "off-the-rack" default contracts to orchestrate relations among owners, and between owners
and managers in public corporations.5 2 By providing such "form"
contracts, the state saves each group of owners the cost of reinventing the wheel. In order to minimize transactions costs in forming
business entities, governments should choose default rules based on
the preferences of the majority (or plurality) of owners. In addition,
the state should provide enough discrete entity types to cover
demand for entities with fundamentally different properties.
Finally, those who desire to deviate from the default statutory terms
may do so on almost all matters-basically as long as there are no
adverse impacts on third parties, such as creditors or the tax
collector.
Implicit in Brett McDonnell's discussion is the fact that, despite
major steps, China is still a long way from such an optimal set
of business entity laws. After persuasively arguing that China's
Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) succeeded in spite of the
complex web of formal property rights in the management and profit
of these entities (in large part because in practice many of these
complexities were ignored), McDonnell goes on to show that TVEs
appear suitable only for relatively small enterprises."
Larger Chinese enterprises thus cannot draw on this business
form. The vintage Maoist communist state-owned enterprises of
course are unsuitable; if the Party and traditional approach had
worked there would have been no need for major reforms over the
last three decades. The Chinese Communist Party that runs the
nation has moved toward free enterprise, but has not embraced free
enterprise with fully open arms. Eventually they must offer large
business enterprises one or more business forms that enable the
firms to organize themselves and raise capital as efficiently as
52. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW ch. 1 (1991) (providing an overview of corporate contract theory).
53. McDonnell, supra note 10, at 981.
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public corporations in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other
developed nations.
Troy Paredes, in his contribution to the symposium, raises a flag
of caution at this point: developing nations like China should not
simply copy the corporate models observed in the United States,
Britain, and other developed economies. 54 He argues that in the
United States, free-wheeling corporate law operates in the context
of a host of institutions (e.g. efficient capital and compensation
markets, accounting standards, expert judges, norms of conduct
among corporate directors). Without these constraints, purely
enabling corporate law might well fail to protect shareholders in
general from rapacious managers, and minority shareholders
from financial exploitation at the hands of the majority. Nations
without the host of institutions essential to police such abuse, he
maintains, need mandatory corporate law provisions as a secondbest substitute-at least until they develop these institutions.
Finally, all property, be it land, corporate shares, or other
varieties (patents, gold, etc.) is similar in the face of a government
bent on expropriation. McDonnell's Article highlights the continuing specter of this problem in China. Although the government
has taken large steps away from a collectivized economy, fear of
expropriation has not been extinguished entirely.5 5 Be it land or
shares in a manufacturing company, nobody is going to invest time,
effort, or money in an asset that the state is likely to pluck away.
The Chinese government probably cannot erase fears of expropriation overnight; even if it enacted a constitutional rule like the
United States' Just Compensation Clause, potential investors know
that the reins of power remain in the hands of a small clique who
are willing to kill to retain power (Tiananmen Square), and so their
promise to refrain from expropriations may not be credible. Over
time, however, the Party may establish a reputation for respecting
private property-or the Party may give way to a less threatening
government in which property owners place greater trust.

54. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM.. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004).
55. McDonnell, supra note 10, at 994-95.
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